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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the post privatization performance of privatized companies using a 
sample of privatization cases in Turkey completed within 1990-2000. Research findings 
indicate that, when the performance criteria for private enterprises are considered, 
privatization in competitive industries results in significant increases in return on investment. 
This increase comes from increasing financial leverage, whereas return on assets variable 
does not contribute significantly to increase in return on investment. The cash flow margin 
increases postprivatization, however, asset productivity declines, which is due to the huge 
asset expansion in privatized companies. The expansion in assets doesn’t represent increased 
capital investment, and primarily financed by financial leverage. Privatization benefits stem 
from increased production efficiency and eliminating redundant labor force. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The economic history has witnessed waves of nationalization and privatizations, both being 
defended on similar social and efficiency grounds. Theoretical models can hardly distinguish 
between efficiency superiority of different ownership arrangements. It is generally accepted 
that it is competition and effectiveness of regulation, not ownership that makes difference 
from an efficiency point of view (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Adaman, 1993).  
 
“Austrian” perspective of the efficiency-enhancing nature of private property claims the 
superiority of the private ownership over public ownership. There are two separate 
mechanisms under private ownership preventing deviations from efficiency rules. These are 
shareholder’s control over the managers and the discipline of capital markets in the forms of 
takeovers and bankruptcy cost. Shareholders have control over the management through the 
voting power. Inappropriate behavior by management may cause the termination of their 
relation with the company. However, under conditions of highly dispersed shareholding 
according to portfolio theory as demonstrated by Fama (1977), no shareholders would have 
much incentive to monitor the management’s performance. In addition, costs associated with 
obtaining information about the performance of management team do not leave an incentive 
for shareholders to control the management’s performance. In any case, stockholders cast 
their votes on the management of the companies through their buy or sell decisions in the 
exchanges.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) claimed that the agency problem may be solved 
through the discipline implemented by the capital markets. The threat of takeover emerges 
when management team pursues policies that maximize their own wealth instead. This threat 
deters management to pursue their interests instead of shareholders’ (Vickers and Yarrow, 
1988). However, the informational asymmetry between potential takeover bidders and 
management constitute a drawback in the functioning of the takeover mechanism. 
Management may also, pursue a set of strategic actions to avoid being taken over. The 
difficulties in raising additional capital and the possibility of bankruptcy threaten the 
management that if they did not improve efficiency, they would face the reality of running 
out of capital. This discipline also has severe limitations. If management thinks that their 
decisions do not have an effect on bankruptcy, they will follow their interest-maximizing 
strategy. 
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The so-claimed “public-ownership inefficiency“ is attributed to the lack of capital market 
incentives to monitor manager’s performance, the lack of bankruptcy threat and complexity 
of the “agency” relationship (Demsetz, 1988). Regarding the complexity of agency problem 
under public ownership, the general opinion is that public ownership leads to sub-optimal 
decisions. 
 
Comprising these theories, it is set forth that privatization itself does not lead to the increase 
or decrease in the economic efficiency. Competition and the effectiveness of the regulation 
are determining factors that affect the efficiency gains from privatization. Vickers and 
Yarrow (1988:pp 44) writes: “Where product markets are competitive, it is more likely that 
the benefits of private-monitoring systems (e.g. improved internal efficiency) will exceed any 
accompanying detriments (e.g. worsened allocative efficiency)… In the absence of vigorous 
product market competition, however, the balance of advantage is less clear cut and much 
depend upon the effectiveness of regulatory policy.” 
 
Empirical literature provides partial support to the theory that private sector is more efficient 
than public sector. Financial literature provides evidence that privatization results in 
significant increases in profitability, output, operating efficiency, and dividend payments 
(Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh, 1994). However, the methodology of these 
researches can be criticized, since these studies focus almost exclusively upon the ownership 
variable and fail to take proper account of the effects on performance of differences in market 
structure, regulation, and other relevant economic factors.    
 
In the other hand, the previous empirical studies on privatization overwhelmingly, focus on 
the developed countries, overlooking developing countries. However, the form and context of 
privatization are quite different in developing countries and it is necessary to make a 
distinction. Weak market structure, weak competition structure in markets, frequent failures 
of markets, weak regulation structure, political interventions, unequal income distribution, 
high levels of unemployment, regional imbalances, and relations with richer countries imply 
that the effects of privatization policies might be different in developing world.  
 
State economic enterprises in Turkey have dominated industrial and service sectors since 
nineteen thirties. State economic enterprises were given the role of providing underpriced 
semi-processed inputs to the private sector.  In addition, most state economic enterprises have 
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to shoulder the burden of coping with the uncertainty prevalent in newly opened markets. 
State enterprises also assumed to give importance to technology-intensive investments. The 
serious regional imbalances in Turkey require the shifting of the capital to the regions with 
low-income by public enterprises. Strategic units of the economy, such as 
telecommunications and industries related with national security are dominated by public 
enterprises, as well (Önder, 1993). 
 
The weaknesses of private ownership to deal with the above-mentioned broad set of 
economic priorities have led to the dominations of the public enterprises in the economy so 
far. Turkey followed an inward oriented development strategy which relied on protection and 
import substitution policies until 1980. After 1980 Turkey has been trying to integrate its 
economy to world economy. However, the globalization process throughout the world 
implicitly require privatization allover the developing world. The World Bank, IMF and 
OECD have been very instrumental in this sense, since they set as a precondition for 
obtaining a loan aid (Whitfield, 1992).  
 
Turkey prepared privatization policies in 1985 and has started to implement it since the 
beginning of 1986. Public shares in 219 enterprises have been covered in the privatization 
program. Public shares in 19 enterprises are excluded from the privatization program and 
public shares in 40 enterprises have not been privatized until the end of 2000. Remaining 
enterprises are privatized so far. 
 
The failure of empirical researches to consider changes in the economic conditions and 
market structure and special characteristics of the emerging markets encouraged us to 
investigate the post privatization performance of privatized companies in Turkey. Our 
primary database consists of 162 privatized enterprises in Turkey privatized between 1986 
and 2000. However, since the privatized company is required to have at least, three years pre- 
and post privatization financial statements data, the sample size drastically reduced to 20 
privatization cases. Overwhelming majority of companies in our sample scope is operating in 
the competitive industries. 
 
The hypotheses tested are that privatization (1) increases a firm’s profitability,  (2) increases 
its operating efficiency, (3) increases its capital spending, (4) increases its output, (5) 
decreases employment, (6) decreases leverage.  
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 Experimental design has been chosen to test these predictions. The performance of privatized 
firms is likely to be influenced by changes in market structure, regulation, and other relevant 
economic factors. Our tests, therefore, control for these factors by comparing sample 
privatized firms’ performance with their corresponding industries’.  
 
Research results indicate that privatization results in significant increases in return on 
investment variables of the privatized companies. The increase in return on investment 
variable doesn’t stem from changes in industrial patterns and rather can be attributed to the 
privatization. Preprivatization return on investment variable value was significantly below 
than industrial level, privatization helps them to reach to the industrial standards. 
 
The main source of the significant increase in return on investment variable is the financial 
leverage, whereas another return on equity component which is return on assets doesn’t 
significantly contribute to the increase in return on equity. Financial leverage significantly 
increases by 23% postprivatization. The postprivatization level of financial leverage is 5% 
higher than industry level. The further analysis showed that increasing financial leverage is 
used to finance huge postprivatization asset expansion.  
 
The analysis of why return on assets hasn’t increased significantly after privatization shows 
that there are offsetting effects of two components of return on assets which makes increase 
in return on assets not statistically significant. While first component return on sales, which 
may be defined alternatively as cash flow margin shows statistically significant increase, 
second component, asset turnover, which may be defined alternatively as asset productivity 
variable, declines significantly in postprivatization period.  The significant increase in return 
on sales variable and the significant decrease in asset turnover variable is not due to the 
industrial or economywide changes. These changes are directly attributed to the privatization.  
The increase in return on sales may also be the result of increasing the product prices to 
market levels which were kept below the market levels for social and economic reasons. 
 
The decline in asset turnover variable is somewhat surprising, since privatized companies are 
assumed to increase their asset productivity. The analysis of sales (quantity) changes shows 
that privatized companies have increased their sales significantly. It means that in order to 
observe declining asset productivity, total assets should expand in much higher ratios than 
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sales. The analysis of capital investment variable indicates that asset expansion is not due to 
the capital investment, which is necessary for the long-term viability of enterprises.  
 
Further analysis of the gains from privatization shows that production and sales efficiency 
increases after privatization. These increases are due to the declining employment. 
Employment in privatized companies has been cut by 42% after privatization.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes sample and data used 
in the study. Section III describes the research methodology. Section IV analyzes 
postprivatization performance of privatized firms. Section V gives a brief conclusion.  
 
 
II. SAMPLE AND DATA 
 
Privatization practices have started to implement in Turkey since the beginning of 1986. 
Privatization program covered public shares in 219 enterprises. Public shares in 19 enterprises 
are excluded from the privatization program and public shares in 40 enterprises have not been 
privatized until the end of 2000. Remaining 160 enterprises are privatized so far. 
 
Our primary database consists of 162 privatized enterprises in Turkey privatized between 
1986 and 2000. This primary database converted to the final sample space using the below-
mentioned criteria:  
 
1. Privatized companies should operate in manufacturing industry.  
2. The privatized company is required to have three years preprivatization and three 
years postprivatization financial statements data available in the files of State 
Privatization Office of Turkey. 
 
Due to unavailability of financial statements data for most of the privatized companies in the 
files of State Privatization Office of Turkey, our sample size drastically reduced to 20 
privatization cases. All of the available data of privatized enterprises are collected from the 
files of State Privatization Office of Turkey. The financial statements data for industrial 
comparison purposes are collected from the Istanbul Stock Exchange Dataset.  
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
3.1. Testable Predictions  
 
Since our primary objective is to test whether there are any performance improvements after 
the privatization, we examine the cash flow, profitability, operating efficiency, output, and 
capital investment variables. Specifically, we test the hypotheses that privatization (1) 
increase the privatized firm’s cash flow, (2) increase the privatized firm’s cash flow margin, 
(3) increase privatized firm’s asset productivity, (4) increase privatized firm’s operational 
efficiency, (5) increase privatized firm’s capital spending, (6) decrease privatized firm’s 
employment cost.  Table 1 presents our testable predictions and the empirical proxies we 
employ. 
 
3.2. Variables  
 
We use Du Pont system of analysis to see whether privatization has caused performance 
improvements in privatized companies. The focus point of our study is return on equity and 
return on assets.  
 
Return on equity is the cash flow variable and measures improvements in operating 
performance in the basis of invested equity. ROE is measured by using EBİT divided by the 
total equity. We define EBIT, measured over the year, as sales, minus cost of goods sold and 
selling and administrative expenses, depreciation expenses. This measure excludes the effect 
of interest expense and taxes.  
 
By definition,  
 ROE = EBIT/Equity 
 ROA=EBIT/ Assets     
 
By making following transformations, we may express ROE in terms of ROA and financial 
leverage (FL). 
 ROE = (EBIT/Assets)*(Assets/Equity)  
 ROE = ROA/(Equity/Assets)=ROA/((Assets-Debts)/Assets)) 
 ROE=ROA/(1-FL)     (1) 
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Table 1 
Summary of Testable Predictions 
This table details the economic characteristics we examine for changes resulting from privatization. We also present and define the empirical proxies we 
employ in our analyses. The index symbols post and pre in the predicted relationship column stand for postprivatization and preprivatization, respectively.  
 
Variable    
 
Proxies Predicted Relationships
Return on Equity (ROE) = EBIT /Total Equity ROEpost>ROEpre Cash Flow Return on Assets (ROA) = EBIT /Total Assets  
 
 
 
 
 
ROApost>ROApre 
 
Return on Sales (ROS) = EBIT /Sales 
 
ROSpost>ROSpre Cash Flow Components 
Asset Turnover (AT) = Sales/Total Assets ATpost>ATpre 
 
Financial Leverage  
 
Financial Leverage (FL) =Total Debts/Total Assets 
 
FLpost>FLpre 
 
Capital Expenditure to Sales (CESA) = Capital Expenditure/Sales 
 
CESApost>CESApre 
 
Capital investment Capital Expenditure to Total Assets (CETA) = Capital Expenditure/Total Assets CETApost>CETApre 
   
Sales Efficiency (SALEF) = Sales (Quantity /Employer SALEFpost>SALEFpre Efficiency Production Efficiency (PREF) = Production(Quantity)/Employer PREFpost>PREFpre 
 
Total Output (OUTP) = Total Output (Quantity) 
 
SALEFpost>SALEFpre 
 
Output and Sales Total Sales (SALE) = Total Sales (Quantity) PREFpost>PREFpre 
 
Capacity Utilization  
 
Capacity Utilization (CU) = Production/Capacity 
 
CUpost<CUpre 
   
Employment Number of Employers (EMP) PEEpost<PEEpre 
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Therefore, ROE can be expressed in two components; ROA and FL. Therefore any increase 
in ROE may come from two sources: An increase in ROA or an increase in FL.    
 
If there are improvements in ROA in the postprivatization period, it can arise from two 
sources. These include improvements in cash flow margins and greater asset productivity. 
Cash flow margin (ROS), which is EBIT on sales, measures the pretax operating cash flows 
generated per sales dollar. Asset turnover (AT) measures the sales dollars generated from 
each dollar of investment in assets (market value of the assets). The variables are defined so 
that their product equals to the ROA.  
 ROA = EBIT/ Assets = (EBIT/Sales)*(Sales/Assets) 
 ROA = ROS*FL      (2) 
 
Operating efficiency variables primarily deal with the increased usage of labor to produce 
more output. Sales and Production on total employment provide a measure to test the 
improvements in operating efficiency.  
 
Cash flows can be increased by focusing on short-term performance improvements at the 
expense of the long-liability of the firm. To assess whether the merged firms focus on short-
term performance improvements at the expense of long-term investments, we examine their 
capital investments. Two empirical proxies are employed to measure capital investments; 
capital expenditures to sales and capital expenditures to total assets.  
 
Privatizations benefits may also stem from the lowered labor costs. Because we are unable to 
obtain sufficient data on wages directly, we examine number of employers to analyze changes 
in labor costs in years surrounding the privatization.  
 
The efficiency implications of the privatization extend to the increased usage of the capacity, 
which is measured by the capacity utilization ratio.  
 
3.3 Research Methodology 
 
We use two different approaches to test the effects of privatization on the performance of the 
firms.  
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First approach exploits the raw variable data for privatized companies over pre- and 
postprivatization windows. We first compute empirical proxies for every company for a six -
year period: three years before through three years after privatization. We then calculate the 
median of each variable for each firm over pre- and postprivatization windows 
(preprivatization= years –3 to –1; postprivatization = years +1 to +3). Year 0, the year of the 
privatization, is excluded from the analysis since the variable values for this year are not 
comparable.  
 
We use Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test as our principal method of testing for significant changes 
in the variable values. We base our conclusions on the standardized test statistic Z, which for 
samples of at least 10 follows approximately a standard normal distribution.  
 
Second approach exploits industry-adjusted variable values. If we focus exclusively upon the 
ownership variable and fail to take proper account of the effects on performance of 
differences in market structure, regulation, and other relevant economic factors, it would be 
misleading to state that performance improvements or deteriorations are due to the 
privatization. Economic factors have much effect on the postprivatization performance of the 
privatized firms and some of the difference between the preprivatization and postprivatization 
performance could be due to economywide and industry factors, prior to a continuation of 
firm-specific performance before the privatization. Hence, we use industry-adjusted 
performance of the privatized firms over pre- and postprivatization windows as our primary 
benchmark to evaluate postprivatization performance. 
 
Industry-adjusted performance is calculated by subtracting the industry median from the 
sample firm value for each year and firm. We use the financial data of companies operating in 
Istanbul Stock Exchange in calculating industry-adjusted values. Here again, Wilcoxon 
Signed-Rank Test and is used for testing the significant changes in variable values.  
 
IV. Empirical Results  
 
In this section we present and discuss our empirical results for the sample of privatized firms. 
We present and discuss our empirical results (in Table 2) for the complete sample of 15 
privatizations using raw variable data. We also discuss our results for the privatization 
sample using industry-adjusted variable data (Table 3).  
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Table 2 
Postprivatization Performance Analysis: Summary of Results Using Company Raw Data 
This table presents empirical results for our full sample of privatizations. For each empirical proxy we give the number of usable observation, the mean and 
median values, standard deviation of the proxy for the three-year periods prior and subsequent to privatization, the mean and median change in the proxy’s 
value for postprivatization versus preprivatization period, and a test of significance of the change in median values. The final column detail the percentage of 
firms whose proxy values change as predicted. 
Variables N (Median) 
Pre 
privatization 
Mean  
Pre 
privatization 
Standard 
Deviation 
Post 
privatization 
Mean  
(Median) 
Post 
privatization 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Change 
(Median) 
Z-Statistics 
Difference in 
Medians 
Percentage of 
Firms that Shows 
Post privatization 
Increase 
Cash Flows         
Return on Equity (ROE) 20 0.20
(0.12)
0.38 0.42 
(0.45) 
0.54 0.22
(0.33)
1.98***  
  
   
  
  
   
  
   
  
  
0.80
Return on Assets (ROA) 20 0.14
(0.07)
0.19 0.17 
(0.16) 
0.15 0.03
(0.09)
1.08 0.70
Cash Flow Components  
Return on Sales (ROS) 20 0.07
(0.08)
0.19 4.33 
(0.28) 
9.40 4.26
(0.20)
2.76*** 0.85
Asset Turnover (AT) 20 1.21
(1.08)
0.64 0.53 
(0.50) 
0.37 -0.68
(-0.58)
-3.81*** 0.05
Financial Leverage  
Total Debt/Total Assets  (FL) 20 0.37
(0.32)
0.24 0.57 
(0.57) 
0.22 0.20
(0.25)
2.46*** 0.85
Capital Investment 
Capital Expenditure to Sales (CESA) 15 0.03
(0.02)
0.03 0.17 
(0.02) 
0.08 0.14
(0.00)
1.14 0.53
Capital Expenditure to Total Assets 
(CETA) 
15 0.06
(0.04)
0.08 0.07 
(0.01) 
0.12 0.01
(-0.03)
-0.63 0.27
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Table 2 
Postprivatization Performance Analysis: Summary of Results Using Company Raw Data 
Continued 
Variables N (Median) 
Pre 
privatization 
Mean 
Pre 
privatization 
Standard 
Deviation 
Post 
privatization 
Mean 
(Median) 
Post 
privatization 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Change 
(Median) 
Z-Statistics for 
Difference in 
Medians 
Percentage of 
Firms that 
Changed as 
Predicted 
Operating Efficiency   
Sales Efficiency (SALEFF) 19 999
(989)
763 1,865
(1,831)
1,670 671
(842)
3.34***  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
0.84
Production Efficiency  (PRODEFF) 20 970
(974)
757 1,717
(1,743)
1,464 747
(769)
3.32*** 0.85
 
Output and Sales 
Total Output (OUTP) 20 274,970
(279,117)
185,265 312,548
(329,009)
226,772 37,578
(49,892)
1.65* 0.60
Total Sales  (SALE) 19 311,817
(308,903)
189,363 359,786
(407,727)
250,060 47,969
(98,824)
1.89* 0.63
Capacity Utilization 
Capital Utilization (CU) 20 0.72
(0.72)
0.15 0.72
(0.80)
0.30 0.00
(0.08)
0.93 0.55
 
 
Employment  
Employer (EMP) 20 370
(308)
335 398
(179)
935 28
(-129)
-3.01*** 0.90
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using two-tailed test. 
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Table 3 
Postprivatization Performance Analysis: Summary of Results Using Company Industry-Adjusted  Data 
This table presents empirical results for our full sample of privatizations. For each empirical proxy we give the number of usable observation, the mean and 
median values, standard deviation of the proxy for the three-year periods prior and subsequent to privatization, the mean and median change in the proxy’s 
value for postprivatization versus preprivatization period, and a test of significance of the change in median values. The final two columns detail the 
percentage of firms whose proxy values change as predicted. 
Variables N (Median) 
Pre 
privatization 
Mean  
Pre 
privatization 
Standard 
Deviation 
Post 
privatization 
Mean  
(Median) 
Post 
privatization 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Change 
(Median) 
Z-Statistics 
for 
Difference in 
Medians 
Percentage 
of Firms 
Changed As 
Predicted  
Cash Flows          
Return on Equity (ROE) 20 -0.29
(-0.32)
0.40  
  
  
  
   
-0.02
(-0.06)
0.51 0.27
(0.26)
2.20** 0.80 
Return on Assets (ROA) 20 -0.15
(-0.19)
0.19 -0.11
(-0.13)
0.14 0.04
(0.06)
1.19  0.70 
Cash Flow Components         
Return on Sales (ROS) 20 -0.22
(-0.21)
0.19 4.03
(-0.03)
9.40 4.25
(0.18)
2.80*** 0.85 
Asset Turnover (AT) 20 0.21
(0.07)
0.63 -0.37
(-0.41)
0.35 -0.58
(-0.48)
 
3.44***
0.15 
Financial Leverage         
Total Debt/Total  Assets 
 (FL) 
20 -0.02
(-0.07)
0.22 0.20
(0.20)
0.22 0.22
(0.27)
2.88*** 0.85 
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using one-tailed test 
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 4.1. ROE Changes 
 
Research findings indicate that privatized companies’ ROE shows median 33% increase after 
privatization. 80% of all firms experience increasing ROE. The difference between pre- and 
postprivatization ROE values are statistically significant at 1 percent level. Examining 
standard deviations, it is seen that postprivatization ROE shows much more dispersion 
compared with preprivatization period.  
 
The examination of industry-adjusted ROE, in order to see whether ROE increases can be 
attributed to the industrial patterns, shows that preprivatizion ROE is on median 32% lower 
than private companies who belongs to the same industry. However, after the privatization 
privatized companies’ average and median ROE reach to the industry average and median. 
The postprivatization change in industry-adjusted ROE values is significant at 1 percent level.  
 
The median improvement in postprivatization raw ROE is 33%, whereas the median 
improvement in postprivatization industry-adjusted ROE of companies is 26%. This shows 
that 26% of postprivatization improvements are attributed to the privatization and 7% of 
postprivatization improvements are attributed to the industry’s trend.  
 
4.2. ROA Changes 
 
ROA is one out of two components of ROE. The analysis of privatized companies shows that 
median preprivatization ROA changes from 7% to postprivatization value of 16% showing 
9% improvement. The change in median values is not significant, though 70% of privatized 
firms experience increasing ROA.  
 
Industry-adjusted analysis shows that privatized companies industry-adjusted ROA value 
experience postprivatization 6% increase. However, the change in the industry-adjusted ROA 
values after privatization is not significant at conventional levels again. 
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4.3. Financial Leverage Changes 
 
The second component of ROE is the financial leverage (FL). Increases in FL cause higher 
ROE. Preprivatization median FL of companies is 32%. This ratio has increased by 25 % 
after the privatization. The change in FL is significant at 1% significance level. 85% of 
privatized companies experience increasing FL after the privatization.   
 
Apparently, increased usage of the financial leverage does not mean exploitation of redundant 
debt capacity, since FL of privatized companies is on median 20% higher than their 
counterparts in the same industries postprivatization. The Wilcoxon test statistics for the 
changes in the industry-adjusted variable values is significant at 1 % level, showing that 
privatized firms do not follow industrial trend.  
 
4.4. Changes in ROA Components  
 
As we have mentioned in the research methodology section, changes in ROA may stem from 
two sources: changes in return on sales (ROS) or increasing asset turnover (AT). Though, 
there aren’t significant changes in raw and industry-adjusted ROA variable values, the 
analysis of ROA components show that ROA components shows significant and 
interestingly, inverse changes.  
 
The analysis of ROS value shows that median ROS value in the preprivatization period is 
only 8%. This value has increased 20% on median after the privatization, reaching to the 
28%. The Wilcoxon test statistics for the changes in the variable values is significant at 1 
percent significance level and 85 percent of all firms experience improvements in ROS 
values. 
 
The analysis of industry-adjusted values shows that privatization was able to raise ROS of 
formerly public-owned companies to the industry levels. Preprivatization industry adjusted 
ROS increased from negative 21 % to the negative -3% after privatization. The Wilcoxon test 
statistics is significant at 1 percent significance level and 85 percent of all firms experience 
improvements in industry-adjusted ROS values. Total 20% increases in postprivatization 
ROS improvement is attributed 18% to the privatization and 2% to the average industry 
variable value increases.  
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 The surprising finding which is contrary to our research findings is the significant decline in 
the asset turnover (AT). Preprivatization median AT value of companies was 1.08, but it has 
decreased to 0.50 after privatization. The decrease in AT is 58% and statistically significant at 
1% level. Interestingly, 95% of the privatized companies have experienced deteriorating AT. 
The analysis of industry-adjusted AT values to see whether economywide and industrial 
patterns have any effect on AT shows that privatized firms owned higher AT ratio than their 
industries prior to the privatization. However, this ratio has significantly decreased after the 
privatization and fell 41% below than industry median. Therefore, decreases in AT cannot be 
attributed to the changes in the industries. The unexpected decline in the AT shows that 
privatized companies experience huge asset expansion.  
 
4.5. Operational Efficiency, Output and Employment Changes 
 
Financial literature predicts that internal efficiency increases as a result of the privatization. 
Our research findings confirm to this prediction: sales and production efficiency increases 
after the privatization. Sales efficiency is measured as the units sold divided by the total 
number of employers, whereas production efficiency is the units produced over the total 
number of employers 
 
Each employer has produced 974 units of product in median prior to the privatization. This 
number increases to 1743 units of product postprivatization. The difference is substantial and 
significant at 1% significance level. 85% of all privatized companies have experienced 
increasing production efficiency. Similar patterns exist in sales efficiency. Increase in sales 
efficiency is significant at 1% level and 84% of all privatized companies has experienced 
increasing sales efficiency after privatization. 
 
The analysis of the components of sale and production efficiency shows that total quantity of 
output and sales have increased significantly postprivatization. The Wilcoxon test statistics is 
significant at 10% level.  
 
Apparently, the main leading component of increasing efficiency is decreasing employment 
in privatized firms. Total number of employers has decreased from median 308 person to 
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median 179 person. All of the privatized firms have experienced declining employment in 
their companies. Wilcoxon test statistics is significant at 1 percent level. 
 
The increase in the production and sales efficiency through declining employment is 
consistent with the writings of Ertuna (1993). Ertuna writes: ”…Political interference is 
rightfully blamed for more than 20% redundancies (in public-owned industries)”. Of course, 
privatized companies first get rid of this redundancies and this has been reflected in increased 
sales and production efficiencies.  
 
4.6. Capital Investment 
 
Capital investment intensity is measured by capital expenditure divided by sales (CESA) and 
capital expenditures divided by total assets (CETA). On median our sample firms decrease 
their capital investment relative to total assets and sales .It means that the asset increases were 
not due to the capital investments. However, both measures are not statistically significant 
according to the Wilcoxon tests. These results suggest that privatizing firms are not 
sacrificing their long-term perspective for the short- and medium-term profitability.  
 
 
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
Our empirical analysis of postprivatization performance of privatized firms provides support 
to the “higher internal efficiency of privately owned firms” hypothesis when the performance 
criteria for private enterprises are considered1. Privatization of companies is associated with 
postprivatization increasing returns. Shareholder’s gain significantly higher returns after 
privatization, however, their returns just reach to the industrial levels. Surprisingly, due to the 
offsetting movements in its components; return on sales and asset turnover, return on assets 
does not contribute significantly to this increase. It is rather financial leverage, which is used 
to finance huge asset expansion of privatized firms that causes sharp increases in cash flows 
to shareholders. Cash flow margin increase significantly postprivatization, representing 
declining costs and increasing revenues. However, asset productivity significantly declines 
due to the huge postprivatization asset expansion. This asset expansion doesn’t represent 
                                                 
1 Since the efficiency gains mostly result from elimination of redundant labor and increasing returns on sales, 
this may not mean increased efficiency in terms of “value added” generation.   
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increased capital investment since capital investment ratios do not change significantly. 
Privatization results in increased operating efficiency and it come from decreased 
employment and increased production and sales.  
 
Summarizing postprivatization performance of privatized companies, it can be suggested that 
privatization results in efficiency increases. This efficiency increase may be due to the fact 
that privatized companies included in the sample operate in competitive industries. Therefore, 
the researchers should be cautious to generalize it to the all privatization cases in Turkey and 
should take the competitive structure of the industry into attention. 
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